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I. INTRODUCTION
Every story has its twists and turns. The story of the downfall of the Bay
Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), the provider of designer steroids to
numerous Olympic and professional athletes, is no exception. In May 2008,
the BALCO steroid saga came full circle when a federal jury for the United
States District Court of the Northern District of California convicted ex-
Olympic track coach Trevor Graham of lying to investigators about his
contacts with an admitted steroids dealer. '
Graham was the individual responsible for tipping off anti-doping officials
and the federal government to the illegal activities of BALCO, leading to the
downfall of BALCO, the successful pursuit of doping charges against
numerous high profile athletes, and ultimately to the conviction of Trevor
Graham himself. In 2003, Graham anonymously sent a syringe containing an
undetectable steroid, then called "the Clear" by those who used it, to the
United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA).2 Since, USADA has worked
* An associate at Holme, Roberts & Owen LLP, in its Colorado Springs office; J.D. University of
Chicago Law School; Wellsley College graduate.
Chief Executive Officer of the United States Anti-Doping Agency; J.D. Southern Methodist
University, Order of the Coif, B.A. University of North Carolina.2010 J.D. candidate at the UCLA School of Law.
1. United States v. Graham, No. 06-00725 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55630 at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July
21, 2008) (Graham II).
2. Lance Williams & Bob Egelko, Verdict Mixed in S.F. Steroid Trial of Coach, S.F. CHRON.,
May 30, 2008, at Al. The jury deadlocked in 10-2 and 11-1 in favor of conviction, respectively, on
charges of making false statements to federal agents about supplying his athletes with drugs and ever
meeting Heredia despite the prosecutor's possession of the photograph of the two. Id.; see also
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with several laboratories to reverse engineer the substance and develop and
validate a test for the detection of the designer steroid now known as
tetrahydragestrinone (THG).
Without Graham, the BALCO scandal surely would not have broken as it
did. If he had not mailed the syringe to USADA, a number of athletes using
the Clear might have avoided detection for a longer period of time. Yet, in the
end when he was faced with criminal prosecution it was Trevor Graham who
sought a legal ruling which, if he had been successful, could have changed and
potentially undermined the anti-doping efforts for Olympic sports.
In his criminal case, Graham asked the federal district court to declare
USADA a governmental entity so that he could more easily obtain documents
in discovery from USADA.3 Had USADA been declared a governmental
entity pursuant to Graham's motion, it would undoubtedly not have taken long
for defense counsel representing doped athletes to contend, among other
things, that USADA's no advance notice drug testing problem should be
subject to Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements. 4
With his conviction, Graham became the latest person to be found guilty
of steroid-related criminal activity in the United States' fight to enforce federal
law and to rid sports of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). 5  Shortly
thereafter, USADA imposed on Graham a lifetime ban from Olympic sport for
his involvement in facilitating drug use by athletes coached by him.
The key figure in the fight against drugs in American sport since late 2000
has been USADA, the independent anti-doping agency for Olympic-related
sport in the United States. USADA aims to uphold the ideals of fair play, the
integrity of sport, and to protect the health of athletes in the Olympic, Pan
American, and Paralympic Games. 6 Though USADA has had significant
success fulfilling its mission by disciplining sixteen athletes and two coaches
connected to the BALCO doping conspiracy to date, some in the U.S. have
been publicly critical of USADA's efforts, including, unsurprisingly, those
Graham 1H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55630, at *3.
3. United States v. Graham, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Graham 1).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... .").
5. Besides Graham, ex-cycler Tammy Thomas was convicted by a federal jury on three counts of
making false statements to a federal grand jury in November 2003, and on one count of obstructing
justice. Michael McCann, Cyclist's Trial May Foretell Bonds' Fate, SI.COM, Apr. 7, 2008,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/michael-mccann/04/07/tammy.thomas.balco/index.html.
On October 5, 2007, Marion Jones admitted lying to federal agents about her use of steroids prior to
the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics. Michael S. Schmidt & Lynn Zinser, Jones Pleads Guilty to
Lying About Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A1.
6. USADA, http://www.usada.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
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suspected or accused of violating sport anti-doping rules. 7 For example,
perhaps the best known attack aimed at USADA came from now disgraced
Olympic sprinter Marion Jones, who, prior to conviction on federal charges for
lying about her drug use, called USADA a "secret kangaroo court" and
threatened to sue should she be barred from competitions. 8
Graham and Jones have each, implicitly or explicitly, raised the question,
previously discussed in scholarship, whether the creation of USADA
constitutes a ploy to privatize a government function thereby depriving
athletes of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and the
Jencks Act. 9 This article addresses the Jencks Act argument unsuccessfully
advanced by Graham and others and demonstrates that USADA is a private,
independent, autonomous entity whose only connection with the government
is the shared goal of ridding sports of PEDs. A proper reading of the law
compels a finding that USADA is not a federal agency and is not subject to the
Jencks Act. Further, USADA cannot be, and should not be, found to be a state
actor under any of the tests that have been employed by the United States
Supreme Court.
To understand USADA one must understand the doping problem it was
created to address. Section II of this article describes the climate under which
USADA took over as the anti-doping agency in the United States. Section III
describes the structure of USADA and examines its investigatory procedures.
Section IV explains why Trevor Graham lost his Jencks Act argument and
why a court should not consider USADA a federal agency. Section V reviews
the history behind the various tests of the state actor doctrine employed by the
Supreme Court. Lastly, Section VI applies the state actor tests to USADA,
concluding that USADA is not a state actor.
7. It should be noted that USADA does not participate as lead prosecutors in federal criminal
trials, but rather prosecutes athletes through private dispute resolution in the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, a private entity headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, and contracted by the International
Olympic Committee, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and numerous other National Olympic
Committees and other Olympic sporting organizations to resolve disputes.
8. Paul C. McCaffrey, Note, Playing Fair: Why the United States Anti-Doping Agency's
Performance-Enhanced Adjudications Should Be Treated as State Action, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
645, 648 (2006). In October 2007, this mere hunch proved correct as Jones admitted to doping and
cheating on her way to winning five medals at the 2000 Sydney Olympiad. A.J. Perez, Poll: Doping
Questions Cloud Americans' View of Games, USA TODAY, July 31, 2008, at Al.
9. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 647-48; Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action
Doctrine's Application to Amateur Sports, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 183, 184 (2008); Barrie Houlihan,
Building an International Regime to Combat Doping in Sport, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 62 (Roger Levermore & Adrian Budd eds., 2004); see
also Jencks Act of 1957, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).
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II. HISTORY OF USADA
Prior to the Games of the XXVIIth Olympiad, held in Sydney, Australia in
2000, there existed a strong international perception that PEDs were widely
used by U.S. Olympic athletes.' 0  Rumors abounded concerning the
withdrawal by some American athletes scheduled to participate in
international athletic competitions when the athletes learned the events would
be drug tested."l This international sentiment was part of what prompted the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to ultimately advance a radical
new approach to fighting drug use in Olympic-movement sports. 12
The Olympic Games are organized in many layers of national and
international governing bodies as well as sport-specific organizations. In the
United States, the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) of each Olympic sport
and Paralympic sport' 3 have relationships with the USOC and the
International Federations (IFs) for that NGB's sport, a relationship that
facilitates international competition. 14  The USOC is a member of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the entity responsible for conducting
the Olympic Games.
The idea and need to develop an independent anti-doping agency
overseeing Olympic sports in the United States dates back to 1975 when
President Gerald Ford established the Commission on Olympic Sports
Olympic Task Force. 15 The Task Force aimed to study various means to
10. Leslie Horna, US. Anti-Doping Agency, OLYMPIC COACH, Fall 2000, at 6.
11. Anne Benedetti & Jim Bunting, There's a New Sheriff in Town: A Review of the United
States Anti-Doping Agency, 2 INT'L SPORTS L. REv. 19, 20 (2003).
12. See generally, Alan Abrahamson, USATF Is Issued Deadline by USOC, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2004, at D14.
13. For any sport which is included on the program of the Olympic Games, Paralympic Games,
or the Pan-American Games, a NGB may be recognized after proving amateur sports status, proving
that it is the sole NGB for its sport, and completing an application of eligibility. For the sport that it
governs, an NGB may (1) represent the U.S. in the corresponding international sports federation; (2)
establish national goals and encourage attainment of those goals; (3) coordinate the amateur athletic
activity for that sport in the U.S.; (4) exercise jurisdiction over international amateur athletic activities
and sanction international amateur athletic competitions in the U.S.; (5) conduct amateur athletic
competitions (including national championships, and international amateur athletic competitions) and
establish procedures for determining eligibility standards for participation; (6) recommend individuals
and teams to represent the U.S. in the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan-American Games; and (7)
designate individuals and teams to represent the U.S. in international amateur athletic competitions.
See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220524 (2000).
14. Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes Over
Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, I DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 124
n.3 (2003).
15. Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-
Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 91, 94 (2005).
[Vol. 19:1
DOPERS ARE NOT DUPED
improve the United States' performance at international sporting events. The
task force's findings led to the eventual passage of federal law now known as
the Ted Stevens Amateur and Olympic Sports Act in 1978 (the "Sports
Act") 16 establishing the USOC as the sole entity for nominating athletes to the
Olympic Games and empowering it to recognize a NGB for each Olympic
sport. 17 This centralized organization of the United States Olympic movement
with the purpose of developing athletes across sports enabled the current level
of success that Americans have enjoyed at the Olympic Games. 18 However,
despite the USOC's many positive influences on American athletic
achievement, 19 concerns both abroad and in America that U.S. athletes were
fueled by drugs necessitated intensive investigation during the next decades.20
While skepticism regarding seemingly super-human performances of
athletes is not novel, one of the first proven blows to the purity of Olympic
sport occurred in 1988, at the Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea.2z After
shattering the 100 meter dash record with a time of 9.79 seconds, Canadian
sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for stanozolol, an anabolic steroid. 22
Johnson's gold medal was revoked and his record was erased from the record
books.2 3 While Ben Johnson became the first high-profile athlete to be caught
and sanctioned for the use of PEDs, several critics appeared surprised that the
new poster-child of Olympic drug cheats was not an American.2 4
Suspicion regarding the American Olympic movement and its athletes
grew during the 1980s and 1990s due in large part to rumors of the USOC and
its NGBs protecting their athletes.2 5 There was a wholesale lack of credible
16. 36 U.S.C. § 220524.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. while the United States boycotted the 1980 XXII Olympiad in Moscow, the United States
accumulated 174 medals, including eighty-three gold medals at the 1984 Olympiad in Los Angeles.
1984 Summer Olympics, DATABASEOLYMPICS.COM, http://www.databaseolympics.com/games/
gamesyear.htm?g=21 (last visited Aug. 1. 2008).
20. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?,
supra note 15, at 95-97.
21. U.S. and Soviet Officials Uniting to Discourage Athletes' Drug Use, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 3,
1988, at Sports. Article notes that Johnson had been disqualified that week after the results from his
tests at the Games in late September had come back positive. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., despite not
having positive tests in Seoul, agreed that working to stop drug cheats was a necessary goal,
following the drug scandals. Id.
22. Perez, supra note 8.
23. Id. Johnson was eventually banned from any Olympic competition for life in 1993 for again
testing positive for steroids after a race in Montreal. Nikki Dryden, For Power and Glory: State-
Sponsored Doping and Athletes'Human Rights, 13 SPORTs LAW. J. 1, 13 n.80 (2006).
24. Benedetti & Bunting, supra note 11, at 19-20.
25. Id. Critics claimed that the USOC would allow athletes to participate in the Olympic Games,
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evidence to support any such rumors, but the USOC suffered from a severe
public perception problem. In response, President Clinton approved the
formation of the White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports in America
in 2000 (the White House Task Force). 26 Charged with formulating a plan to
protect and rehabilitate the American image while cleaning up Olympic sport,
it painted a grim picture of the future of the American Olympic movement,
concluding that "[the] use of drugs in sports has reached a level that endangers
not just the legitimacy of athletic competition but also the lives and health of
athletes - from the elite ranks to youth leagues." 27 This conclusion, as well as
a review of the support behind the report, eventually convinced USOC
President Hybl, on June 15, 1999, to convene the USOC Select Task Force on
Drug Externalization (the Select Task Force). 28
The mission of the Select Task Force was to bring together experts and
professionals of various backgrounds, many previously uninvolved to sport, to
determine (1) if a new external anti-doping program should be established in
the United States and (2) to recommend what that program should accomplish
if it was determined to be appropriate.29 The recommendations made by the
Select Task Force paved the way for the creation of USADA in 2000.30 In
fact, the direct result of the Select Task Force was to recommend that the
USOC externalize its entire anti-doping efforts by creating an independent
anti-doping agency. 3'
III. USADA's STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES
USADA is a non-profit, non-governmental agency organized under the
laws of Colorado. 32 The USADA Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing
despite testing positive for steroids, by exonerating them through its internal appeal process. Id
These criticisms, however, seem unfounded as the USOC's National Anti-Doping Panel (NADP) for
the quadrennial 1996-2000 had perceived, but not actual, problems. Further, after several independent
inquiries into the practices under the NADP-including the McLaren inquiry-the IAAF v. USA TF
decision, and the recent IOC inquiry - no credible facts or evidence of any drug cover-up by the U.S.
has been proven. See IAAF v. USATF, CAS 2002/O/401,award of Jan. 10, 2003.
26. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?,
supra note 15, at 109.
27. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 65 C.F.R. 49469 (2000), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
28. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?,
supra note 15, at 105.
29. Tygart, supra note 14, at 124.
30. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Mission, History, USADA.ORG, http://www.usada.org/whol
mission/html (last visited Aug. 4, 2008).
31. Tygart, supra note 14, at 124-25.
32. See generally U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING (2004), available at http://usada.org/files/active/
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(the Protocol) has several established precautionary measures to ensure both
actual and perceived independence from the USOC, the federal government,
and Olympic athletes. USADA's board of directors is self-perpetuating and
has ten members, all of whom must be unaffiliated with any of the above listed
groups. 33 Of the ten members, five are elected from outside the Olympic
family, while the remaining five may be recommended by the NGBs and the
USOC Athlete Advisory Committee, consisting of individuals who have
competed in the Olympic Games or a World Championship representing the
United States in the previous ten years. 3
4
USADA receives a grant from the federal government and contracts with
the USOC to conduct drug tests and provides results management for athletes
in the Olympic movement within the United States. 35 USADA also provides
education and research programs. 36 The USOC provides funding to USADA
for performing the valuable service of independent testing for PEDs and
prohibited methods of gaining competitive advantage. 37 The agreement with
the USOC grants it no rights to dictate policies of USADA regarding which
athletes are tested, the process of sample collection, or the results management
process.38
Besides insulating USADA from the USOC and the government, the
Protocol also ensures USADA's independence from any athlete's potentially
adversarial interests. Active elite athletes, including active ones, are not
permitted on the Board or to be employed by USADA. 39 These measures, in
addition to a strict conflict of interest policy for its employees, officers, and
directors, distance USADA from any actual or apparent influence by the
USOC with respect to testing and the adjudication of positive tests.40
The pool of athletes subject to USADA testing includes any athlete who is
a member of an NGB, athletes competing in an international event in the
what/protocol.pdf [hereinafter PROTOCOL].
33. See U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Meet USADA, USADA.ORG, http://www.usada.org/who/
meet (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
34. PROTOCOL, supra note 32, art. 2.
35. Id. art. 1.
36. John Meyer, Teen Fencer Gets One-Year Suspension for Use of Drug, DENVER POST, May 2,
2001, at D2 (quoting Terry Madden).
37. Blood doping is when an athlete will inject oxygen-rich red blood cells, either their own or
those of another, to artificially increase the ability to process oxygen. World Anti-Doping Agency, A
Brief History of Anti-Doping, WADA-AMA.ORG, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=312 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
38. See generally, PROTOCOL, supra note 32.
39. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Meet USADA, supra note 33.
40. Tygart, supra note 14, at 127.
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United States, American athletes representing the United States in
international competition, and athletes who are present in the United States
during a suspension for an anti-doping violation prior to that athlete's
retirement.4 1 These athletes can be selected for testing for any reason or no
reason at all, provided the athlete is participating in, or is likely to participate
in, international competition such that the testing is in furtherance of
USADA's primary purpose. 42  Upon selection, an athlete must provide
USADA with a urine sample that is split into two locking bottles (referred to
as A Sample and B Sample). 43 The athlete splits the sample in front of a
doping control officer and closes the Berlinger bottles, specially designed to
make any tampering after collection immediately obvious, prior to the samples
being sent to a World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) accredited laboratory for
analysis. 44 For any athlete whose A Sample reveals the presence of any
banned PED or an elevated level of naturally occurring hormones above the
threshold WADA has set for those hormones, a test of the B Sample can be
performed to confirm the A Sample result. 45 B Sample analysis may be
attended by the athlete or his or her representative. 46 A positive test of the B
Sample that confirms the A Sample result is considered by USADA to be an
adverse analytical finding (AAF) and forms the basis of an anti-doping rules
violation. 47 An athlete may waive his or her right to have a confirming B
Sample test, also resulting in an AAF.
48
Upon receipt of a confirmed positive test, USADA turns the case over to
the Anti-Doping Review Board (the Review Board).49 The Review Board
consists of three to five independent medical, technical, and legal experts. 50
The lab results and any materials submitted by the athlete are looked at by the
Review Board in an anonymous fashion. 51 The Review Board makes a
recommendation to USADA on whether there is sufficient evidence of an anti-
doping rules violation to proceed. 52 During a Review Board meeting, an
41. PROTOCOL, supra note 32, art. 4.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 8(b).
44. Id. art. 7(b).
45. Id. art. 8(b).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. art. 8(e).
50. Id. art. 9(a).
51. Id. art. 9(c)(ii).
52. Id. art. 9(c)(i)(5).
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athlete either may not testify or have a lawyer appear. 53
Following the Review Board's recommendation, USADA may decide to
charge an athlete or other person with an anti-doping rule violation. At this
time, the charged person may choose one of two alternative paths. 54 The
athlete may refuse to challenge the charges and accept a sanction. 55
Alternatively, the athlete may challenge the charge and request a hearing
before an arbitration panel consisting of one or three arbitrators selected from
the American Arbitration Association (AAA)/North American Court of
Arbitration for Sport (NCAS) with appeal available to the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS). 56 CAS is the final arbiter in doping cases. 57
IV. THE JENCKS ACT AND ITS INAPPLICABILITY TO USADA
Often, and particularly true in the cases arising from the BALCO
investigation, the federal government conducts a parallel investigation to that
of USADA in efforts to stop steroid-related crimes. USADA regularly
cooperates with the federal government in its information gathering. 58
Athletes and others faced with a federal government prosecution often argue
they should have the same right of access to USADA's documents as they do
to those held by the Department of Justice. 59 This argument fails, as the
Jencks Act does not apply to USADA because it is not a federal agency.
A. The Jencks Act and Defining a Federal Agency
The Jencks Act 60 and the production of materials defined in case law and
refered to as Brady/Giglio materials 6' are two means whereby a criminal
defendant can require the production of materials in the possession of a federal
government agency that are believed to be material to guilt or punishment.
The Jencks Act, promulgated in 1957 after the case involving the famous actor
Clinton Jencks, allows a criminal defendant in a federal prosecution to
discover any witness statement against him, which is relevant to the witness's
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 10(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 9(b).
57. Id. art. 10(c). A limited appeal right is available to the Swiss Federal Tribunal. That tribunal
will not review the substance of the matter and has deferred substantially to the CAS in the rare
occasion that a further appeal has been taken.
58. See United States v. Graham, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Graham 1).
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
61. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1963).
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testimonial, in possession of the United State government. 62 In interpreting
the Jencks Act, the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland held that the
government must disclose evidence that "is material either to guilt or to
punishment. ' 63 This standard of materiality was later expanded to include any
type of evidence that could impeach a government witness. 64  These
disclosure requirements, however, only apply to the government or federal
agencies. 65
Discovery obligations under the Brady/Giglio line of cases are limited to
the materials within the possession of federal agencies. 66 "The prosecutor will
be deemed to have knowledge of and access to anything in the possession,
custody or control of any federal agency participating in the same
investigation of the defendant."'67
No one case defines "federal government agency" for discovery purposes
in a criminal matter. Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 68 an
agency is defined as "each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency," excluding
Congress, the courts, and certain other law-making and judicial entities. 69
Under the APA, agencies are entities created by statute that have the power to
engage in rulemaking and adjudication. 70
Cases addressing the meaning of "federal government agency" in other
contexts indicate that USADA is not a government agency. Further, the facts
surrounding USADA's operations and the underlying investigation establish
that USADA is not a government agency.
"Agency" within Title 18, the Criminal Code, of the United States Code is
defined to include "any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any
corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the
context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited
sense." 71 The United States has no proprietary interest in USADA. Based on
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
63. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. This type of evidence has also been referred to as "exculpatory
evidence."
64. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
66. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154-55 (1972).
67. United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989).
68. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5 et seq. (2000).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
70. Koden v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 6 (2000).
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a plain reading of the statute, USADA does not qualify as an agency. The
Third Circuit interpreted the definition of "agency" in 18 U.S.C. § 6 in United
States v. Gumbs. 72 In that case, the defendant was charged with making false
claims to the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. 73 Gumbs entered
into construction contracts with the government of the Virgin Islands (GVI) on
projects that were funded through a grant from the Department of the Interior.
The Third Circuit held that the GVI was not a federal government agency as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 6 and that Gumbs therefore could not be convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 287 because that statute required a false claim to a
"department or agency" of the United States. 74 Like the GVI, USADA is not
a governmental agency simply because it receives some funding from the
federal government. Such an argument leads to absurd conclusions, given the
large number of entities that receive government funding but are in no way
government agencies. 75
Entities have also been found to be agents of the government when the
government authorizes, directs, and supervises that person's activities and is
aware of his activities.76 Factors in determining whether a person is a
government agent include the
nature of that person's relationship with the government, the
purposes for which it was understood that person might act on
behalf of the government, the instructions given to that person
about the nature and extent of permissible activities, and what
the government knew about those activities and permitted or
used.77
The case of United States v. Jones is instructive to determine the limits of
when an entity is an agent of the government. In that case, a pawn shop had
cooperated substantially with a government agency, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), it was not enough to find that the private entity
72. United States v. Gumbs, 283 F.3d 128, 130-31 (3rd Cir. 2002).
73. Id. at 130.
74. Id. at 132.
75. For example, the federal government, through the National Endowment for the Arts, funds
numerous arts programs. If all recipients were considered government agencies, hundreds of poets
and local theatre companies would have that designation.
76. This is also known as the "entrapment" theory. See United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364,
1369 (9th Cir. 1994).
77. United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 517 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (ruling that a federally licensed firearm dealer and pawn shop was not a government agent
for entrapment purposes where it cooperated with ATF in providing information about defendant,
including tipping ATF off when defendant retrieved his firearms from the dealer so that ATF could
arrest defendant).
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was an agent of the government. 78
There is no evidence that the government authorizes, directs, or supervises
USADA's activities in any way, and none was presented by Graham. 79 Just as
the pawn shop's work in Jones with the ATF did not turn it into a government
agency, USADA's meeting with government agents as part of parallel
investigations similarly does not do so.
In Tanner v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of
"United States, or any agency thereof," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 37, in the
context of the defendant's conviction for conspiring to defraud the United
States.80 The Court reversed the defendant's convictions for defrauding
Seminole Electric, a private company, even though Seminole's construction
project was funded by a $1.1 billion loan from the Federal Financing Bank and
a credit agency of the United States Department of Agriculture supervised the
construction project. 8' The Court specifically rejected the argument that
"anyone receiving federal financial assistance and supervision" is an agent of
the United States, noting, "the immense variety of ways the Federal
Government provides financial assistance."8 2 The Government's suggested
requirement that there be "substantial ongoing federal supervision" of the
defrauded nongovernmental intermediary before a crime against the United
States occurs was similarly rejected as it failed to provide any real guidance. 83
An argument that USADA is a government agency is even less compelling
than that for Seminole Electric because the federal government exercises no
control over USADA or any of its projects, whereas the federal government
retained almost complete control over Seminole Electric's enormous project. 84
While the cases cited above are civil, the definition of government agency is
the same in the criminal context, providing no further support to any argument
that USADA is a government agency.85 USADA is even more attenuated
78. Id.
79. The government requested and received the Court's permission to allow the presence of a
USADA employee at the execution of the BALCO search warrant in September of 2003. Motion,
Exhibit J, 71. It was made clear therein that the USADA employee's presence was requested for the
purpose of providing technical assistance and that that person possessed no law enforcement
authority. If USADA were a federal government agency, such a request would have been
unnecessary.
80. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 129-130 (1987).
81. Id. at 110.
82. Id. at 132.
83. Id. at 131.
84. Id. at 110.
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 451 and 1345 (2006); Acron Inv., Inc. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 363
F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1966) (finding that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
qualifies as federal government agency because government possesses ownership interest and more
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from the federal government than Seminole Electric, the pawn shop in Jones,
or the GVI.
USADA is an independent, non-governmental organization organized
under the laws of Colorado. The governmental entity that provides USADA
with the majority of its funding, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP), recognizes USADA as an independent, non-governmental
organization. 86 No governmental agencies exercise control over USADA and
USADA cannot automatically bring suit in federal court or remove suits
brought against it in state courts to federal court. 87
While USADA receives federal funding and has provided some assistance
to law enforcement-as do countless other entities and individuals-those
facts do not have the effect of turning USADA into a federal government
agency. USADA has no independent authority to obtain materials from the
government and is free, absent a subpoena or court order, to decline to produce
materials to the government. Indeed, the court in United States v. Conte found
that USADA cannot obtain grand jury transcripts from the United States
Attorney's Office. 88 USADA has no authority to enforce any statutory laws
of the United States, which is a determinative factor in this analysis. 89
In the federal prosecution of Trevor Graham, Graham attempted to obtain
USADA's interview of Angel Heredia, a former Mexican discus champion
and known steroid supplier.90 Graham claimed Heredia was "the single most
than custodial or incidental control); Fed. Land Bank of Columbia v. Cotton, 410 F. Supp. 169, 171
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that the Federal land bank was not an agency of the Federal Government
which would give the district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345. Bank was not an "agency"
within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States Code unless the government had a substantial
proprietary interest in it, or at least exercised considerable control over operation and policy in the
corporation. Federal land bank was meant to be a private rather than governmental corporation, which
would merely be subject to various federal regulations); Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Keiser, 628
F.Supp. 769, 771 (C.D. I11. 1986) (claiming that, despite being a federally chartered corporation, the
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis did not qualify as federal government agency for removal purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345).
86. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 3 (May 22, 2008) (statement of Scott M. Burns, Deputy Dir. of the
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2008/hrg
080522a.html.
87. See 28 U.S.C §§ 1345 and 1346 (2000).
88. See generally, United States v. Conte, 99 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
89. United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that FDA files were in the
government's possession for purposes of prosecution under sections of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act).
90. The federal government prosecuted Graham for perjury. USADA had already convicted
Graham in front of the CAS for violations of the WADA Code. Graham was banned for life from
Olympic activities. See Track Coach Trevor Graham Banned for Life by USADA, L.A. TIMES, July
16, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/sportsla-sp-newswire 16-2008jul16,0,5452083.story.
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important witness for the government in [the] prosecution." 9 1 Graham filed a
motion for production of Jencks Act and Brady/Giglio materials based on the
premise that USADA is a federal government agency must produce this and
any other incriminating evidence. 92 USADA objected and stated, among
other things, that the Jencks Act does not apply to it. 93 In its order, the court
determined that USADA was not a governmental entity. 94 But nevertheless,
the court granted Graham's motion to compel discovery from USADA as a
third party, overruling USADA's contention that the discovery sought
constituted work product because "the need for the material that outweighs
USADA's interest in non-disclosure." 9
5
The fact that USADA regularly conducts parallel civil investigations to
those of the federal government does not make USADA a government agency,
despite any evidentiary overlap with the federal criminal matter. An entity
must, at the very least, act at the government's direction before it can be
saddled with the label and obligations of a federal government agency in this
context-the "prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known
to others acting on the government's behalf in the case." 9 6 USADA's purpose
to enforce sports doping rules is entirely independent and separate from the
government's job to investigate the commission of crimes in violation of
statutory laws. Because USADA is not a government agency and there is no
joint investigation between USADA and the government, the government is
not obligated under the Jencks Act to produce to USADA materials not in the
government's possession. 9
7
V. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine emerged not long after the adoption of the post-
Civil War amendments in United States v. Stanley, collectively referred to as
91. United States v. Graham, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Graham 1).
92. Id. at 1051. Graham simultaneously filed a motion to compel pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37. Id. at 1049; see FED R. Civ. P. 37.
93. Graham I, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
94. Id. at 1048-49.
95. Id. at 1049.
96. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (emphasis added) (holding that state prosecutors
violated Brady when they failed to disclose material, known and unknown to prosecutors, in
possession of state agency investigating defendant's crimes).
97. See United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1991) (claiming that the DEA
and Weber/Morgan County Strike Force, a Utah state agency, were not undertaking a joint
investigation and state agency was working on a separate investigation to bring charges under a Utah
state statute. The federal government was not in possession of the state agency's notes of interviews
for Jencks Act purposes). Id. at 861.
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the Civil Rights Cases, which stated that "[i]t is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amendment." 98  The state action doctrine
holds that the Constitution applies only to national and local governments and
government entities; it does not apply to private actors. 99 In support of this
doctrine, the Supreme Court has articulated two policy rationales.1 °° First, it
explained that the doctrine "preserves an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power."' 0 ' Second, the
Court articulated that the doctrine protects state sovereignty because
structuring the legal relationships of private citizens belongs to the state, rather
than the federal government. 102 To determine whether an individual or entity
can be considered a state actor the Court has articulated three tests: public
function, entanglement, and entwinement. 103 Each test is independent of the
others such that should USADA fulfill any one of the numerous tests
employed over time by the Supreme Court, it could be found to be a state
actor.
A. Public Function Test
The first test, usually referred to as the "public function exception" or
"traditional function test," recognizes that an individual or entity that performs
a function traditionally and exclusively reserved for the government shall be
considered a state actor. 104 First articulated in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., the Court held that a private utility company did not engage in action
sufficient to characterize it as a state actor.10 5 While the Court concluded on
that occasion that the acts of a public utility company do not constitute state
action, it has found state action when a private entity engaged in the
98. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
99. Robert Hochman, Note, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1692-99 (1996).
100. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 512-13 (2006).
101. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
102. Id.; Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001)
(describing tests for determining state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
103. See e.g., Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
104. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (noting that the relevant question to determine state action is
not whether the entity performs a "public function" but whether the function has been traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state) (emphasis in original); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1005 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
105. Jackson, 419 U.S.at 352 (holding that state action exists "in the exercise by a private entity
of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State").
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management of a town, 10 6 park, 10 7 or electoral system. 10 8  Each of these
activities is traditionally performed only by governments. By engaging in
them, the Court found that the private entities at issue were acting as the state
and were therefore subject to the limitations on action set forth in the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court has heard argument that the USOC is a state actor
because it performs a public function. 10 9 The Court refused to find that the
USOC was a state actor and has subsequently refused to extend the doctrine to
other entities involved with the national Olympic movement. 110 In San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, the Court held
that the USOC did not engage in any actions sufficient to recognize it as a
state actor. I II The fact that the USOC exists under a government charter was
deemed irrelevant to the issue of state action since it no more makes the
USOC a state actor than it does any other corporation. 1 2 That the USOC
performs a function in the national interest is also not sufficient for the Court
to find a public function or state action. 113 A national or public interest is in
no way the same as a public function. 114
The public function test has been found applicable in only extremely
limited circumstances, those that historically were solely and exclusively the
prerogative of the state. 11 5
106. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
107. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966).
108. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
109. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
110. It is well established fact that the USOC and NGBs are not considered state actors. See id. at
543 (clarifying that the fact that the USOC has corporate charter and serves a national interest does
not make it a state actor when there is no government control or coercive power exercised over
USOC); Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the U.S.A., 884 F.2d 524, 531 (10th Cir. 1989)
(finding that it follows from the fact that the USOC is not a governmental actor that the ABA/USA,
the NGB for basketball, is also not a governmental actor); DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181, 1191-92 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that the USOC's vote to prevent the national team from
attending the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow can not be considered state action and that the USOC
is an independent body and not so entwined with the government to be a state actor).
111. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522, 543 (1987).
112. See, e.g., Hall v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
that, despite being a federally chartered non-profit corporation, the Red Cross is not a government
actor for hiring and firing purposes), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1010 (1996).
113. See S.F. Arts, 482 U.S. at 543; see also Hall, 86 F.3d at 922-23 (stating that the status of the
Red Cross is based on the situation at hand and not relative to all the functions of the organization,
even if in the national interest).
114. Hall, 86 F.3d at 922-23.
115. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946) (holding that a company operating a town
engages in actions considered to be a public function); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476-78 (1953)
(claiming that the holding of elections is a public function); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302
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B. The Entanglement Test
The entanglement test asks whether the government affirmatively
authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct to such a degree that the
private conduct can be fairly attributed to the government. 116  The first
Supreme Court case to recognize this test, Shelley v. Kraemer, held that a
private agreement not to sell property within a subdivision to persons of color
became illegal when enforced by a court, as the state was acting in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. '1 7 This controversial decision created a slippery
slope as, under Shelley, nearly any private action could be interpreted as state
action, provided that a court acted to enforce it. 11 8 In an attempt to solve this
conundrum, the Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. enunciated a two-part
test for state action that asked whether (1) the deprivation has resulted from
the exercise of a right having its source in statutory authority, and (2) the party
charged with the deprivation can be considered a state actor because his
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state. 119 In Lugar, the Court
considered an ex parte attachment, holding that it constituted state action
because (1) it is authorized by statute, and (2) the sheriff, an agent of the state,
carried out the attachment. 120
Notably, however, entanglement has not been found on the basis of the
receipt of public funding alone. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the school at issue
received ninety-nine percent of its funding from the state government. 12 1
However, this was simply one of many factors reviewed by the Court,
including the governance of the school and involvement of the government in
employment decisions and in policy making. 122 Finding that the state was not
involved in any of these aspects of running the school, or in any others, the
Court held that no state action occurred when the school board fired a number
of its teachers and counselors. 123
C. Brentwood and the Entwinement Test
The Supreme Court's recently endorsed entwinement test recognizes state
(1966) (finding that the maintenance of public parks is a public function).
116. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
117. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
118. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 528.
119. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
120. Id. at 938.
121. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 843.
2008]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
action when it appears that a private entity's actions are "entwined with
governmental policies.., and [its] management or control." 124 The Court
found state action on the basis of entwinement alone for the first time in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
(TSSAA). 125 The level of entwinement necessary to find state action has been
characterized as such that the decisions of the association can be attributed to
the government. 126 Case law and the strong dissent of Justice Thomas suggest
that this will rarely be the case, even when an entity is publicly funded, if there
is independent decision-making at any level. 127
In Brentwood, the Court held that TSSAA, a high school athletics
oversight board, is a state actor after a very fact-based inquiry looking to a
number of factors including access to the state pension fund and the
overwhelming participation by the public schools in the state of Tennessee. 128
Based on these and other facts deemed relevant, the Court found the TSSAA
to be entwined with the state government both from the bottom up, as
membership and organization was overwhelmingly based on, and driven by,
the public schools, and from the top down, as the Tennessee state government
provided, among other things, eligibility for the state pension program for the
ministerial employees of the TSSAA. 129
Another aspect of the entwinement test asks whether there is such a "close
nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private
behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."' 130 To satisfy the
requirement, courts require a showing that either the challenged activity of the
entity results from a state's use of "coercive power" or that the state provides
significant overt or covert encouragement. 131  Brentwood, however,
represented a significant departure from the prior, limited, findings of state
action. Justice Thomas vigorously dissented. 132 The TSSAA is a uniquely
public-private entity that received substantial benefits for its employees from
the state and had a membership of almost entirely public schools.133 It is yet
to be seen whether the Court will continue to expand its definition of entities
124. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001).
125. Id. at 291.
126, See id.
127, Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128, See id. at 298-99.
129. See id. at 300. Notably, the Court's decision in Brentwood represents the first and only time
it has found state action solely on the basis of entwinement.
130. Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
131. Id.at296.
132. See id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 291.
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that are state actors through the use of the entwinement test, or limit
Brentwood to its facts. 134
V. USADA IS NOT A STATE ACTOR OR A FEDERAL AGENCY UNDER ANY
TEST EMPLOYED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
As previously noted, Graham attempted to obtain USADA's interview of
Heredia by filing, among other things, a motion for the production of Jencks
Act and Brady/Giglio materials. These materials, however, may only be
obtained from governmental parties privy to the federal criminal trial. 135 As
demonstrated through the public function, entanglement, and entwinement
tests detailed above, USADA is not a state actor.
A. Public Function Test
USADA does not perform a traditional public function. Applying that test
to USADA, it cannot be found to be a state actor. The Court's analysis
focuses on whether the corporation in question performs a function that has
been traditionally and exclusively the prerogative of the state. 136 Testing
athletes for PEDs and disciplining those who test positive, as well as others
involved in aiding in unnatural performance enhancement in sport, is not a
function performed traditionally or exclusively by the government of the
United States or of any state.
In fact, prior to 2000, USADA's functions were performed by the USOC
and the individual NGBs of each Olympic sport. Because case law already
clarifies that the USOC and other similar entities are not state actors as they do
not perform traditional public functions, similarly, a court likely will not deem
USADA to be one. 137 As previously mentioned, the USOC determined it
would be preferable and more transparent to have an outside entity perform
anti-doping services under contract with the USOC. 138
In the United States, private entities handle the majority of sports-related
134. Megan M. Cooper, Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court Disregarded
the Blum Trilogy, Returned to the Theories of the Past, and Found State Action Through
Entwinement in Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 913,986 (2002).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
136. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (noting that the relevant question to
determine state action is not whether the entity performs a "public function" but whether the function
has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state) (emphasis in the original); see also Blum
v. Yaretsky, , 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 353 (1974)).
137. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 (1987).
138. Tygart, supra note 14, at 127.
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drug testing. The National Football League, Major League Baseball, the
Professional Golf Association, the National Hockey League, and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association each manage the drug testing and adjudication
for its individual league. 139 The role of USADA with respect to Olympic
athletes and Olympic hopefuls is no different than the role of the laboratories
and testing agencies contracted by the professional and collegiate sports
leagues in the United States.
In addition to not performing a traditional public function, USADA also is
not organized or empowered to enforce federal law or the law of any state. 140
It cannot bring criminal charges or cause the incarceration of any individual.
Rather, USADA adopts and enforces its own rules against those who seek to
participate in Olympic and Olympic-related sports. USADA processes alleged
anti-doping rule violations involving athletes, coaches, and others involved
with Olympic sport, but USADA's actions are not similar to those of law
enforcement. 14 1  Often USADA enforces anti-doping rules involving
substances and methods prohibited in Olympic sport that are otherwise
perfectly legal within the United States. Because USADA has been charged
with keeping Olympic sport clean, its rules punish actions far different from,
and frequently outside the realm of, what could be deemed criminal by the
federal government or any state. 142 USADA, however, does not engage in a
selective prosecution of certain criminal laws. USADA has its own rules,
standards, and procedures that it enforces, as necessary, against athletes,
coaches, and others involved in Olympic-related sports.
A relevant example occurred prior to the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in
Turin, Italy, when Zachary Lund, a skeleton 143 athlete, tested positive for
139. See e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2007-2011 BASIC AGREEMENT (2007), available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/cba.jsp; NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012 (2006), available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.
aspx?fmid=l 81 &lmid=231 &pid=0&type=l.
140. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 926 (1982) (noting that enforcement of a
judicial decision is state action).
141. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 93-94 (1963).
142. It is a violation of the WADA Code to test positive for any trace of alcohol when in
competition. It is not illegal in any state or under federal law for an individual over the age of twenty-
one to have trace amounts of alcohol in their system while, for example, playing softball. Also, there
are many prescription medications that are perfectly legal for individuals with a prescription to
possess and take, but that would violate the WADA Code unless the athlete has previously applied for
and been granted a therapeutic use exemption (TUE).
143. Skeleton is a sport similar to the luge. USA Bobsled & Skeleton Federation, Skeleton,
BOBSLEDTEAM.ORG, http://bobsled.teamusa.org/content/index/851 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
Whereas, athletes in the luge travel feet first, skeleton athletes slide down an icy track at very high
rates of speed on a small sled head first. Id.
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finasteride. 144 Though one milligram of finasteride is found in the anti-hair-
loss medication Propecia, 145 it can also be used as a masking agent, hiding the
use of other PEDs. 146 For that reason, the WADA Prohibited Substance List,
also employed by USADA, lists finasteride as a prohibited substance. 147The
fact that finasteride, in its prescription form, is legal under the laws of the
United States does not affect whether USADA may test for, or seek to
discipline individuals for the use or possession of it. USADA may, and does,
test for and punish for the use or possession of any known substance or
mechanism presently recognized by WADA that may aid in sports doping. 148
A few substances on the Prohibited Substance List are available as
prescriptions and a couple are available over-the-counter at stores throughout
the United States.149 Additionally, whether U.S. law prohibits the use and/or
possession of some of the substances on the Prohibited Substance List, not all
of the substances or methods prohibited by USADA are illegal. Unlike the
federal government, which polices the public, USADA's rules only regulate
private activity and do not even apply to all American athletes.
For a court to find USADA a state actor on the facts above would
drastically expand the prior Supreme Court understanding of a public function
and is, therefore, highly unlikely.
B. Entanglement Test
A court also would not be likely to hold USADA to be a state actor under
the entanglement test as it is not sufficiently entangled with the federal
government such that the federal government can control its actions. 150 The
government does not dictate or overtly encourage the undertaking of
USADA's responsibilities. No evidence exists to demonstrate that any state,
state agency, or the federal government exerts control over USADA. The
ONDCP supplies two-thirds of USADA's funding. It does not exert any
144. Finasteride is the primary ingredient in the anti-hair-loss medication Propecia. Propecia,
http://www.propecia.com/finasteride/propecia/consumer/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2008)
145. Id.
146. World Anti-Doping Agency, 2007 WADA Prohibited List, WADA-AMA.ORG,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/prohibited list.ch2 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
147. Id.
148. There is a USADA process by which athletes may obtain permission to use legitimate
medications.
149. See World Anti-Doping Agency, 2007 WADA Prohibited List, supra note 145, at 11.
Ephedrine is common in over-the-counter cold medicines and alcohol is banned in a number of sports
for in-competition testing.
150. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 (1982) (finding state action because the school
was heavily regulated and virtually all its funds came from the state).
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power over USADA's decision making. The ONDCP funding simply mirrors
federal grants received by hundred of thousands of private entities each year.
As demonstrated by the Court's reasoning in Rendell-Baker, the mere fact of
public funding does not make a private entity any more a state actor than an
entity receiving no federal funding.' 51 The other one-third of USADA's
funding is supplied by private funding sources, including the USOC. 152
Additionally, the federal government exerts no control over USADA's
decision-making process or any of its employees. 153 USADA's employees are
not federal or state government employees. Additionally, USADA's contract
with the USOC is merely a contract for services between two private entities,
and nothing more. As articulated in Section I, the Protocol establishes
USADA as a private, independent firm, whose policies are set by its own
board with guidance taken from the policies of WADA, a private international
organization based in Switzerland. 154 The fact that USADA performs services
that are within the national interest and occasionally beneficial to law
enforcement does not lead to the conclusion that any state agent has control
over USADA. 155
C. Entwinement Test
There is also not sufficient evidence to satisfy the heavily fact-specific
inquiry necessary to determine under Brentwood that USADA and the federal
government are "pervasive[ly] entwine[d].' 156 First, USADA's policies are
not entwined with those of the government. The structure of USADA is not a
collection of recognized state actors, such as public schools or city police. 157
Rather, each individual employed by USADA is a private citizen receiving a
paycheck from a Colorado non-profit entity. Additionally, USADA
employees, unlike the TSSAA board members, do not receive any government
benefits, such as pension funds. USADA also does not hold itself out to
represent or act for any government nor do those who are within the ambit of
USADA's testing believe that the government of the United States or any state
151. See id. at 840-41.
152. As noted above in Section I, the USOC is neither a state actor nor a federal agency and
receipt of funds from a private corporation has no effect on USADA's status as a private entity since
countless private corporations receive public funds in the form of grants and contracts without
becoming state actors or agents of the federal government.
153. See generally PROTOCOL, supra note 32, at § 1.
154. See id.
155. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 549 (1987) (performing a
function that serves the public is not necessarily a public function).
156. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
157. See id. at 314 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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is the party that actually performs the tests and seeks the results. In fact, the
only connection between USADA and the federal government stems from the
grant of the ONDCP, which is not a strong enough connection to demonstrate
that USADA is entwined with the federal government. 158 USADA also does
not have a "close nexus" between itself and the State. 159
As previously stated, USADA is a separate entity from even the USOC,
the entity for which it provides virtually all of its services. USADA is not
entangled with the federal government in any manner that could be equated to
the level of entanglement demonstrated in Brentwood. Even assuming that the
Court would again find state action solely on the basis of entanglement,
USADA is so dissimilar from Brentwood that there is no strong argument that
such a finding would ever be made as to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no basis, under any test previously enunciated by the Supreme
Court, to find that USADA is a state actor. While it clearly performs a
function within the national interest and has, particularly with respect to the
BALCO investigations, cooperated with the Department of Justice in the
prosecution of athletes, coaches, and their drug suppliers, these facts do not
rise to the level of state action. Neither is USADA a federal agency. It does
not pass regulations nor is it chartered under a statute defining the scope of its
powers.
The USADA process is fundamentally fair and strikes a fair balance
between the interest of clean athletes and the accused's right to due process
prior to being removed from competition. The Protocol currently provides
athletes within the testing pool with notice of USADA's procedures, which
include a multitude of procedural protections for both athletes and USADA.
The interests of USADA in fair sport and protecting clean athletes must drive
its testing and procedures. USADA has no incentive to falsely punish athletes,
as each positive test demonstrates how far USADA has to go in achieving its
mission.
As USADA is not a government agency, it is not required under the
Jencks Act to turn over evidence that incriminates an athlete, coach, or other
individual in the event that individual finds him or herself in a court of law.
158. But cf id. at 304 (finding entwinement due to a number of substantial factors, including a
greater than eighty-four percent membership of public schools, laws providing access to the state
pension fund and the ability of TSSAA to dictate policies to the public schools demonstrated
entwinement).
159. Id. at 295 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (internal
quotation omitted)).
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USADA is in no way similar to a police force or the Department of Justice.
USADA cannot enforce any laws and its policies and procedures are not
coextensive with the laws of the United States. As noted above, many
substances and methods deemed impermissible in Olympic sport are perfectly
legal under the laws of the United States.
There is no evidence that USADA is under the control of, or is coerced by,
the federal government. Certainly, USADA is not entangled with the
government in the way that the Supreme Court has found necessary to find
that a nominally private entity is in fact a state actor. USADA sets and
enforces its policies to reach its goals of clean sport in the Olympic movement.
USADA cannot be labeled, under the law as it now stands, as a state actor
or federal agency. Absent either of those monikers, USADA has broad
latitude as a private entity duly authorized by the USOC and NGBs to enact
and enforce its policies, the USOC National Anti-Doping Policies, and the
World Anti-Doping Code in pursuit of its goal of clean sport.
